Linked version gives a deeper context and evidence for all the findings highlighted in the summary thread below taken from:

https://xcancel.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1958236017204330654

Exclusive Report: Shipments of engines, cylinders, pistons, and electronics are pouring from China into Alabuga, fueling Russia’s Shahed production. Frontelligence Insight analyzed export data, closed reports, and open sources, revealing the scale of support. 🧵Thread:

2/ Russia has sharply ramped up its use of Shahed (Geran), Garpia, and Gerbera UAVs, from dozens of launches in 2022 to tens of thousands per month by 2025. While Iran played a key role early on, it became clear that the only country that could scale the production was China.

3/ One of the biggest production bottlenecks was engines and electronics, without which large-scale Shahed production would be impossible. To address this, Russia set up multiple LLCs and intermediaries to streamline industrial-scale purchases and deliveries from China

4/ In 2024-2025, Alabuga Machinery LLC imported from China a production line for manufacturing UAV hulls, along with equipment for producing the Iranian Nasir navigation system, modules of which were later recovered from intercepted Shaheds.

5/ In 2024 alone, Drake LLC, a Russian intermediary company purchased by Alabuga Machinery, imported aircraft engine components from China valued at $972,144. The main suppliers were Jinhua Hairun Power Technology Co. Ltd. and Shandong Xinyilu International Trade Co.

6/ In 2024-2025, another Russian intermediary, Morgan LLC, imported goods from China for drone production, totalling $4.83 million into the Alabuga Special Economic Zone. The largest suppliers were Suzhou ECOD Precision Manufacturing and Suzhou Shunxinge Import and Export Trade

7/ Between 2022 and 2025, Alabuga-Volokno LLC, part of Rosatom, imported roughly 3,000 tonnes of carbon fiber yarn from China. The shipments, sourced from Jilin Tangu Carbon Fiber Co. and Jilin Chemical Fiber Friend Textile Co., were valued at $21,387,850.

8/ Based on insider data, we also found that Beijing Micropilot UAV Control System is not the actual manufacturer of the MD550 and MDR208 engines, serving only as a seller, while the engines are produced by Limbach Aircraft Engine Co. These engines are used in Geran-2 UAV’s.

9/ Limbach Aircraft is a key supplier of engines, parts, and technologies for Russian and Iranian UAVs, even as Russia gradually shifts to local production. The company is owned by China’s Fujian Delong Aviation Technology, which also controls Germany’s Limbach Flugmotoren GmbH.

10/ China’s Redlepus TSK Vektor and Russia’s TSK Vektor LLC supplied Harpy UAV components totaling $32.8 million. From 2022 to 2024, Juhang Aviation Technology and TSK Vektor LLC imported $58.4 million in products, with engines like the L550e occupying roughly 40% of deliveries.

11/ Chinese engine maker Mile Hao Xiang Technology Co., whose products are used the Gerbera UAV, shipped over $1.5 million in goods to Russia in 2022-2023, directly or via intermediaries. The main importers were Russian companies Sequoia JSC and Unikom LLC.

12/ Shandong Xinyilu International Trade Co., Ltd, a Chinese trading company based in Shandong province, exported $6.4 million in industrial products to Russia between April 2024 and January 2025, including carbon fiber, engine parts, batteries, and electronic components.

13/ In August 2024, Shandong Xinyilu International shipped carburetors made by Fujian Jingke Technology to Drake LLC, valued at $85,452. The shipment weighed 1,050 kilograms, which, if taken into consideration average weight of carburetor, could equip up to 1,000 UAV engines

14/ This is far from a complete list, but the volumes speak for themselves: whether entire engines or the parts to build them, Russia’s Shahed program depends almost entirely on China. What Moscow calls 100% local production is, in practice, just an assembly of Chinese parts.

15/ Chinese exporters appear fully aware of the end use. In some customs records, they explicitly listed the purpose as “Special Military Operation." For example, this happened with lithium-polymer batteries shipment by Shandong Xinyilu International Trade.

16/ When it comes to sanctions, the picture is murky. Many of these firms are sanctions, but rarely in unison. Some are sanctioned by the U.S. but not the EU, others by Ukraine and the EU but not Washington. The gaps leave plenty of room for business to operate

17/ China, while not a direct participant in the war, plays a critical role by supplying Russia’s military industry with components essential to sustaining this model of warfare. Over time, such cooperation will carry growing risks for both regional security and the West.

18/ We have just released the full version of this article, with more details, sources, references, direct links, and extensive data.